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INTRODUCrION

Numerous Middle Eastern analysts consider the long-standing dispute
over Jerusalem the most formidable stumbling block to the achievement
of a genuine and durable peaceful solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict.
The gap between the positions of the two main rivals, Israel and the
Palestinians, seemed so vast in the past that even the very initial arrange* Lecturer, The Faculty of Law and the Department of International Relations, the
Hebrew University of Jerusalem and Researcher at the Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies. Visiting Scholar, Georgetown University Law Center 1995-1996. I would like to express my deep gratitude to Prof. Ruth Lapidoth, Prof. Marshall Breger, Ms. Ora Ahimeir,
Mr. Gideon Rotem, and Ms. Ruth Levush for their valuable comments. The views expressed in this article are the author's alone.
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ments the parties reached in the 1993 Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangement 1 (DOP) astonished most observers.
Indeed, the DOP's provisions regarding Jerusalem demonstrate that both
parties have significantly deviated from their traditional positions, setting
the stage for a new phase in the long and disputed history of Jerusalem.
The DOP provisions state, inter alia, that the future of Jerusalem will
be negotiated between Israel and "the Palestinian people representatives" (the "Palestinians") in the permanent status negotiations to commence in 1996.2 The central aim of this article is to employ some
concepts developed in the sphere of game theory to identify the factors
standing at the base of the dispute over Jerusalem and analyze their influence upon the outcome of the future negotiations. It should be emphasized at the outset that this article, like game theory in general, does not
aim to suggest what political goals are to be adopted or what desirable
regime the parties should agree upon. Rather, the aim is limited to clarifying the structural features of the dispute and to analyzing the likely
implications of possible structural changes.
Finally, it should be noted here that, though it is common to refer to
the "question of Jerusalem," the controversy over the future of Jerusalem
generally is restricted to control over East Jerusalem. Almost all the involved parties agree that West Jerusalem should remain under Israeli
control.3 This discussion, therefore, will be limited to the future of East
Jerusalem.

II.

THE PROVISIONS OF THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN AGREEMENTS
REGARDING JERUSALEM

Three principal issues regarding Jerusalem are regulated in the recent
agreements between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization
(PLO): the jurisdiction of the Palestinian Council, the elections to that
Council, and the negotiations on the permanent status. The parties to the
1993 DOP and the 1995 Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the
1. Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, Sept. 13,
1993, Isr.-PLO, reprintedin 32 I.L.M. 1525 (entered into force Oct. 13, 1993) [hereinafter
DOP].
2. DOP, supra note 1, art 5, at 1529.
3. For a survey of various positions regarding the legal status of West Jerusalem
under international law, see MOSHE HIRSCH ET AL., WHITHER JERUSALEM? PROPOSALS
AND POSITIONS CONCERNING THE FUTURE OF JERUSALEM 15-18 (1995); see also HENRY
CArI'AN, JERUSALEM 104-07 (1981); ELIHU LAUTERPACHT, JERUSALEM AND THE HOLY

PLACES 16-18, 23-26, 40-46 (1968); Antonio Cassese, Legal Considerationson the International Status of Jerusalem, in 3 THE PALESTINE YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 13,

23-28, 38 (1986).
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West Bank and the Gaza Strip4 (the 1995 Interim Agreement) agree that
a Palestinian Council 5 will be established for a transitional period not
exceeding five years.6 Both instruments provide that the Palestinian
Council will not have jurisdiction in Jerusalem for the five year interim
period.7 This statement contradicts the traditional PLO position that
Israel should withdraw from East Jerusalem, the intended capital of the
Palestinian state.8
According to both agreements the Palestinians of Jerusalem will have
the right to participate in the election process for the Palestinian Council. 9 The election arrangements in Jerusalem are elaborated in the 1995
Interim Agreement. 10 These arrangements, implemented on January 24,
4. Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, Sept.
28, 1995, [hereinafter 1995 Interim Agreement].
5. DOP, supra note 1, art. 1, at 1527 (defining the Council as the "Palestinian Interim
Self-Government Authority, the elected Council (the 'Council'), for the Palestine people in
the West Bank and the Gaza Strip"); see also 1995 Interim Agreementc supra note 4, fifth
recital to the Preamble (noting that the one aim of the peace process is to establish a
"Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority").
6. See 1995 Interim Agreement, supra note 4,arts. III - IX (outlining the structure,
size, and powers of the Council).
7. See DOP, supra note 1, arts. IV - V, at 1528-29 (stating that "j]urisdiction of the
Council will cover West Bank and Gaza Strip territory, except for issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations"); 1995 Interim Agreement, supra note 4, art.
XVII. Moreover, in paragraph 5 of Annex II to the DOP, supra note 1, at 1537, the Palestinian side undertook to locate all the "offices responsible for carrying out the powers and
responsibilities of the Palestinian authority ... in the Gaza Strip and in the Jericho area
pending the inauguration of the Council." See Joel Singer, Aspects of Foreign Relations
under the Israeli-PalestinianAgreements on Interim Self-Government Arrangements for the
West Bank and Gaza, 28 ISRAEL L. REV. 268, 292-93 (1994) (explaining the function of
paragraph 5 of Annex II of the DOP). The parallel provision is located in Article 1(7) of
the 1995 Interim Agreement, supra note 4.
8. See Palestine National Council: Political Communique and Declaration of Independence, Nov. 15, 1988, 27 I.L.M. 1661, 1665 (1988) (calling for Israel's withdrawal from
MENACHEM KLEIN, TIHE JERUSALEM QUESTION IN THE ARAB-IsRAELI PEACE NEGOTIATIONS - ARAB STANDS 11, 26-27 (1995) (Hebrew). On October 11,

Jerusalem); see also

1993 Israel's Minister of Foreign Affairs sent a letter to the Foreign Minister of Norway
regarding the preservation of the Palestinian institutions in East Jerusalem. On the possible legal effects of this letter, see Ruth Lapidoth, Jerusalem and the Peace Process, 28
ISRAEL L. REV. 402,428-30 (1994); Singer, supra note 7 at 292-93; and KLEIN, supra, at 2627.
9. DOP, supra note 1, Annex I, Protocol on the Mode and Conditions of Elections,
art. 1, at 1535. This article provides: "Palestinians of Jerusalem who live there will have the
right to participate in the election process, according to an agreement between the two
sides." Id.; see also 1995 Interim Agreement, supra note 4, art. 11(3).
10. See 1995 Interim Agreement, supra note 4, Protocol Concerning Elections, Annex
II, art. VI (discussing details such as polling locations, campaigning, international observation, and voting procedures); see also Joel Singer, The West Bank and Gaza Strip: Phase
Two, 7 JUSTICE 1, 4-6 (Dec. 1995) (explaining the Electoral Process under the 1995 Interim
Agreement).
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1996, reflect a shift in Israeli policy, resulting from a change in the government itself following the 1992 Israel elections. Prior to these agreements Israel was reluctant to allow the Arabs of East Jerusalem to
participate in the elections for the Palestinian Council.1 1
As to the more distant future, beyond the interim period, both the 1993
and the 1995 instruments state that the issue of Jerusalem's future will be
one of the subjects on the agenda for the permanent status negotiations
to commence not later than May 4, 1996.12 Unquestionably, this arrangement represents a clear deviation of both parties from their long-standing
policies. Israel's leaders formerly asserted that the status of Jerusalem
was not open for negotiations, while their Palestinian counterparts insisted that any solution affecting the West Bank also should apply to East
13
Jerusalem.
The emerging situation from the above developments is somewhat
mixed. The prominent fact is that Israel will continue to exercise control
over East Jerusalem in the transitional period. Israel did not agree to
relinquish this control in the future permanent settlement accord. On the
other hand, Israel did agree to apply the election arrangements to East
Jerusalem which are quite different from those applying to other areas
under its sovereignty. As to the future, it seems that the parties' consent
to negotiate the issue of Jerusalem in the permanent status negotiations
indicates that the current arrangements in East Jerusalem are modifiable
to a certain degree.
III.

BASIC ELEMENTS OF GAME THEORY

In this section some basic elements of game theory will be explained.
The aim here is not to present a general introduction to game theory but
11. This contentious issue arose following the Israeli government's Peace Initiative of
May 1989. See THE ARAB-ISRAEL CONFLICT AND ITS RESOLUTION: SELECTED DocuMENTS 357-65 (Ruth Lapidoth and Moshe Hirsch eds., 1992) (reprinting the text of the
Peace Initiative of the Government of Israel of May 1989 and reactions thereto);
DEBORAH HOUSEN-COURIEL AND MOSHE HIRSCH, EAST JERUSALEM AND THE ELECTIONS
INTENDED TO BE HELD IN JUDEA, SAMARIA, AND THE GAZA STRIP ACCORDING TO THE
PEACE INITIATIVE OF THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL OF MAY 1989 (1992) (Hebrew).

12. See DOP, supra note 1, art. V, at 1528-29; id., Agreed Minutes, at 1542; 1995
Interim Agreement, supra note 4, art. XXXI(5). Article XXXI (5) provides: "Permanent
status negotiations will commence as soon as possible, but not later than May 4, 1996,
between the Parties. It is understood that these negotiations shall cover remaining issues,
including: Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security arrangements, borders, relations and
cooperation with other neighbors, and other issues of common interest." Id.
13. See KLEIN, supra note 8, at 40 (commenting on the Palestinian position regarding
Jerusalem); Lapidoth, supra note 8, at 420 (explaining the traditional position of Israel
regarding Jerusalem).
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rather to expose briefly its most basic notions which will enable us to
analyze the problems relating to the future of Jerusalem. 4
Game theory is a discipline "designed to treat rigorously the question
of optimal behavior" of decision makers in strategical situations."a The
term 'strategical' refers to situations in which the outcomes depend not
only on the decision-maker's conduct alone, nor solely on those of nature,
but also on the conduct of other participants (the latter fact led some
scholars to label the theory "Interactive Decision Theory"). 6 The participants are assumed to be rational in the sense that they strive to maximize their interests and assume that the other players aim to achieve the
same goal." The attainment of this goal does not necessarily direct the
actors to "beat" each other and not infrequently they are required to
"help" the others as a condition to realize their own aim.' 8 In its formative years game theory was developed chiefly by mathematicians and
then rigorously applied to economics. The theory also was applied in
other disciplines such as political science, international relations, law, sociology, and biology. 9
Game theory models interactions between the participants in two principal forms of representation: the normal (or strategic) form and extensive (or tree) form.2" A matrix showing each player's payoff for each
combination of strategies often represents a normal game. The normal
representation is more appropriate for simultaneous decision-making
while the extensive form is more convenient for sequential-move games.
The extensive form representation also displays the information each
14. For a general introduction to game theory see DREW FUDENBERG & JEAN TIROLE,
GAME THEORY (1991); ROBERT GIBBONS, GAME THEORY FOR APPLIED ECONOMISTS
(1992); SHAUN P. HARGREAVES HEAP & YANIS VAROUFAKIS, GAME THEORY: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION (1995); R. DUNCAN LUCE & HOWARD RAIFFA, GAMES AND DECISIONS: INTRODUCTION AND CRITICAL SURVEY

(1957);

JOHN VON NEUMANN & OSKAR

MORGENSTERN, THEORY OF GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR (3d ed. 1953).
15. Oskar Morgenstern, Game Theory: Theoretical Aspects, in 6 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 62 (David L. Sills ed., 1968) (explaining the premise

underlying game theory).
16. Robert J. Aumann, Game Theory, in THE NEW PALGRAVE: GAME THEORY 2
(John Eatwell et al. eds., 1987); see Morgenstern, supra note 15, at 62.
17. See FUDENBERG & TIROLE, supra note 14, at 4.
18. Id.
19. See KEN BINMORE, ESSAYS ON THE FOUNDATIONS OF GAME THEORY 15 (1990);
FUDENERG & TIROLE, supra note 14, at 4; VON NEUMANN & MORGENSTERN, supra note
14, at 1-29; Aumann, supra note 16, at 2; Morgenstern, supra note 15, at 62.
20. See Aumann, supra note 16, at 2-3; see also BINMORE, supra note 19, at 15; GIBBONS, supra note 14, at 2, 115 (illustrating the normal and extensive forms of representation); VON NEUMANN & MORGENSTERN, supra note 14, at 1-29; Morgenstern, supra note
15, at 62-63.
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player knows when making his decisions. 21 A "game" is defined as "any
interaction between [players] that is governed by a set of rules specifying
the possible moves for each participant and a set of outcomes for each
possible combination of moves. "22
The basic elements of the normal form game are: 1. THE PLAYERS-the
actors who make the decisions (either individuals or collective decisionmaking units like firms or states); 2. THE STRATEGY SPACE-the range of
moves available to a player in a given situation (e.g., to cooperate or to
defect); 3. THE PAYOFFS ("utilities")-the outcome generated for the
23
players from a chosen move or strategy.
Reducing some set of interactions to a normal or extensive game, the
next step is to determine the game's solution. Finding the "solution" of a
game may serve two major purposes: first, a normative goal, as it may
guide us to the best strategy a rational player may adopt; and second, a
predictive aim, as it may indicate how rational players are likely to behave in such situations. A simple example is the notion of dominant
strategy. A strategy is considered strictly dominant to any other when it
is the best choice for a player regardless of what the other players will
do.2 4 When it is possible to identify a single dominant strategy, we safely
can assume that a rational player will adopt the dominant strategy and
reject the subordinate ones.25 While a strict dominance strategy will not
solve many games, the Nash-equilibrium solution applies to a much
broader spectrum of games. A Nash-equilibrium is the combination of
strategies, representing the best response of each player to the predicted
strategies of the other players. Such a prediction may be called "strategically stable" or "self-enforcing" because no single player is interested in
deviating from his predicted strategy.2 6
This is only a limited exposition of the most basic elements of game
theory; and some others will be presented in the following parts.
21. See
FUDENBERG

DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 50
& TIROLE, supra note 14, at 67; GIBBONS, supra note 14, at 115-16.

(1994);

22. See HEAP & VAROUFAKIS, supra note 14, at 1-2, 4.
23. See BAIRD ET AL., supra note 21, at 7-9; FUDENBERG & TIROLE, supra note 14, at
4-5; GIBBONS, supra note 14, at 2-4; VON NEUMANN & MORGENSTERN, supra note 14, at
15-16, 48-54.
24. See BAIRD ET AL., supra note 21, at 11-12.
25. Id. at 13-14; FUDENBERG & TIROLE, supra note 14, at 6-8. A dominant strategy
can also be found by a process of iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies. See
GIBBONS, supra note 14, at 4-8.
26. FUDENBERG & TIROLE, supra note 14, at 11; see BAIRD ET AL., supra note 21, at
19-25); GIBBONS, supra note 14, at 8-9; see BAIRD ET AL., supra note 21, at 21-23;
FUDENBERG & TIROLE, supra note 14, at 11-12; Bruce Lyons, Game Theory, in THE THEORY OF CHOICE: A CRITICAL GUIDE 93, 101 (Shaun H. Heap et al.
eds., 1992).
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IV.

Is

IT POSSIBLE TO APPLY CONCEPTS OF GAME THEORY TO THE
QUESTION OF JERUSALEM?

Having explained the basic concepts of game theory, the reader might
wonder whether it is possible to apply such concepts to the question of
the future of Jerusalem. The major difficulties to game theoretic analysis
of this problem relate to three principal factors: (1) the assumption regarding the rationality of the players; (2) the possibility of assigning accurate payoffs to the players moves; (3) the role of factors that game theory
does not take into account.
As explained above, one of the most basic assumptions of game theory
is that the players are rational. The rationality assumption is the most
notable obstacle for the application of the theory to the question of Jerusalem because there is considerable doubt that the national decision-makers dealing with this issue proceed in a rational way. Indeed, one of the
central factors explaining why it is so difficult to find an appropriate solution for the question of Jerusalem is located on the symbolic or psychological level rather than on the rational one.
One of the principal reasons underlying the dispute over Jerusalem is
that the controversy exceeds the city's boundaries. In contrast to almost
all other cities in the world, the future of Jerusalem is important not only
to those who inhabit the city. During the last decades Jerusalem has become a major national and religious symbol for Jews, Muslims, and Christians all over the world. Thus, the main struggle is not for territorial,
strategical, or economic gains, but rather for symbols.
Given the symbolic character of the dispute, is it 'rational' to analyze it
in a rational framework such as game theory? A distinction should be
made here between the process of choosing an appropriate aim and the
process of its attainment. As explained above, the players in game theoretic models are assumed to be rational in the sense that they strive to
maximize their interests. It is not a pre-condition to the application of
the theory that the chosen interest be selected in a rational process. The
focus here is on the instrumental sense of rationality,2 7 i.e., on the manner
in which the selected interest will be maximized.
As to the dispute over East Jerusalem, the principal interest of the
main contending parties, Israel and the Palestinians, is to exercise sovereignty or control over Jerusalem. While it is true that the factors motivating the decision-makers to adopt this interest as a desirable one are not
wholly rational, we safely can assume that the actors do strive to maxi27. Shaun H. Heap, Rationality, in THE THEORY OF CHOICE: A
supra note 26, at 4-5; HEAP & VAROUFAKIS, supra note 14, at 5.

CRITICAL GUIDE,
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mize this interest. Thus, the symbolic (or irrational) factors standing behind the aim of exercising sovereignty or control over East Jerusalem do
not bar us from applying concepts of game theory to the process of attaining this aim.
The second difficulty the tools of game theory encounter in the analysis
of the question of Jerusalem relates to the possibility of allocating accurate payoffs to expected outcomes. The knowledge that both parties are
interested in exercising sovereignty or control over East Jerusalem does
not enable us to assign a numerical payoff to this outcome. The problem
is further complicated if an attempt is made to allocate accurate payoffs
to some intermediate outcome, such as partial control over East Jerusalem or certain sections of it. In fact, this problem recurs in numerous
situations in which concepts of game theory are employed to analyze social phenomena.
In some cases, it is possible to assign ordinal payoffs to expected outcomes (i.e., to organize the various outcomes in accordance with the order of priorities for the relevant player) and then to allocate a respective
ordinal number to each outcome. The employment of this method may
assist us in arriving at interesting inferences in numerous situations,2" but
without knowing the "distance" between payoffs on an interval scale, it is
impossible to calculate accurately the probabilities with which each party
would choose each.29 Furthermore, in some cases it is impossible to attribute even ordinal payoffs to the different results and, as a consequence,
to calculate the accurate probability that a certain decision will be made.
Even in such situations, as we shall see below, game theoretic analysis
may well be a valuable tool to provide us with significant indications regarding the expected trends of decision-makers and the pattern of decisions likely to be adopted in particular settings.
The third difficulty of analyzing the question of Jerusalem in light of
game theory concepts lies in the fact that various personal and social factors are not taken into account in such an analysis. It is undeniable that
factors external to game theory frequently influence the behavior of
states and other political entities. Such factors relate, for example, to the
psychological characteristics of the decision-makers and to social values
prevailing in the decision-makers' environments. Indeed, this basic fact
should be kept in mind throughout this article and whenever one attempts to analyze social phenomena with the aid of concepts of game
28. For a discussion of this method of assigning payoffs, see HEAP & VAROUFAKIS,
supra note 14, at 5-11; Duncan Snidal, The Game Theory of International Politics, 38
WORLD POL. 25, 46-48 (1985); see also STEVEN J. BRAMs, GAME THEORY AND POLITICS
13-16 (1975) (using the ordinal method of assigning payoffs to analyze a specific case).
29. BRAMS, supra note 28, at 20.
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theory. While game theory may shed light on one of the more central
aspects of the dispute over Jerusalem's future, game theory certainly is
not the only methodology to be used in a comprehensive study of that
question.
In summary, the two principal difficulties accompanying an analysis of
the question of Jerusalem's future using concepts of game theory are the
impossibility of assigning numerical payoffs to specific outcomes and the
influence of external factors which game theory does not take into account. These difficulties do not exclude the importance of such an analysis, but rather restrict its ramifications. Though the first difficulty bars us
from arriving at precise conclusions, game theoretic analysis nevertheless
provides a valuable tool to detect important indications regarding the expected trends of decision-makers and the pattern of decisions in particular settings. The second difficulty demonstrates one of the limits of game
theoretic analysis, but certainly does not deprive such an analysis of any
significance.

V.

THE ELEMENTS OF THE "GAME"

30

OF JERUSALEM

The first phase in a game theoretic analysis of a particular situation is
to define the basic elements of the situation in terms of game theory.
Here we must define who the players are, the moves available to them,
and the payoffs in the "game" of Jerusalem.
A.

The Players

The players in the "game" of Jerusalem may be divided into three circles in accordance with the level of their involvement and interests in the
game.
1. External Circle
In the external circle we find the players which have some general, but
no direct, interest in the future of Jerusalem. These players do not claim
a significant position in the future regime of the City. The players in this
circle are, e.g., the United States, the European Union, and the United
Nations.
2.

Middle Circle

The players in the middle circle claim, explicitly or implicitly, some significant role or special rights in the future system to be established in East
30. The term "game" is employed here and throughout this article to refer only to an
interactive situation within the framework of game theory.
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Jerusalem, and particularly regarding the administration of the Holy
Places. Here we may find Jordan,3 1 the Vatican, 32 and various churches
and Christian denominations that possess religious buildings or sites in
the City (e.g., the Greek Orthodox and Armenian.Church).
3.

Inner Circle

The players in the inner circle expressly claim the legal right of sovereignty or control over East Jerusalem. The main players in the core of
the game are Israel and the Palestinians.33
While the players in all circles have some influence over the future regime to be established in East Jerusalem, their levels of respective influence are different. It is quite clear especially since the conclusion of the
1993 DOP, that the players in the inner circle have the crucial role of
shaping the future arrangements to be applied to the City, while the other
players will have to accept the "deal" they strike. Some of the players in
the other circles may have some objections to the agreement Israel and
the Palestinians reach, but their ability to block its implementation seems
31. Jordan was considered a main player in the past. From 1967 to the early 1970s,
Jordan demanded that Israel withdraw from East Jerusalem, as well as the whole West
Bank, so that Jordanian sovereignty would be restored in this area. See HIRSCH ET AL.,
supra note 3, at 135. Since the early 1970s, however, this position has gradually changed
especially following the 1974 Arab Summit Conference at Rabat. Id. The new Jordanian
policy, which does not claim sovereignty over East Jerusalem, was formally expressed in a
speech that King Hussein delivered on July 31, 1988. Id. in this speech, the King announced "the dismantling of the legal and administrative links between Jordan and the
West Bank," including East Jerusalem. Id. Despite the King's declaration, however,
"Jordanian officials nevertheless indicated that Jordan would continue to play its historical
role as the guardian of the Islamic Holy Places in Jerusalem." Id.; see HRH Crown Prince
Hassan Bin Talal, A Study on Jerusalem 17-49 (1979); see also Israel-Jordan: Treaty of
Peace, Oct. 26, 1994, art. 9, reprinted in 34 I.L.M. 43, 50 (recognizing Jordan's special historic role in the Muslim Holy Shrines in Jerusalem). For a discussion of more recent developments regarding Jordan's position, see KLEIN, supra note 8, at 43-56.
32. The Vatican's position regarding East Jerusalem has also changed over the years.
In the past (at least until 1967), the Vatican supported the idea of internationalization.
HIRSCH ET AL., supra note 3, at 127-28. More recently, however, Vatican representatives
have advocated the idea of a "special status" for the Old City, supported by international
guarantees to ensure the rights of the three monotheistic faiths. Id. at 128; see G.I. IRANI,
THE PAPACY AND THE MIDDLE EAST, 1962-1984, at 75-81 (1986); R.P. Stevens, The Vatican, the Catholic Church and Jerusalem, in THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE PALESTINE PROBLEM WITH SPECIAL REGARD TO THE QUESTION OF JERUSALEM 172 (H. Kochler ed., 1981).
33. For a survey of the main parties' legal claims to East Jerusalem, see YEHUDA Z.
BLUM, LEONARD DAVIS INST. FOR INT'L RELATIONS, THE JURIDICAL STATUS OF JERUSALEM 1 (1974); CArAN, supra note 3, at 111-21; see also HIRSCH ET AL., supra note 3, at
18-21; LAUTERPACHT, supra note 3, at 48-49; W. THOMAS MALLISON & SALLY V. MALLISON, THE PALESTINE PROBLEM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER 197-201,206,

233 (1986); Y. Dinstein, Zion Shall be Redeemed in InternationalLaw, 27
(1971) (Hebrew); Stevens, supra note 32, at 162-63.
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quite modest. This observation does not exclude the possibility that certain players in the middle or outer circles will have some role in the nego34
tiating process, or in the future regime that the main actors agree upon.
B.

The Strategies

Three principal strategies are available to the main players in the negotiations over the future of Jerusalem:
1. To continue exercising (for Israel) or to gain (for the Palestinians) full sovereignty or control over all parts of East
Jerusalem;
2. To relinquish the claim to full sovereignty or control over all
parts of East Jerusalem; or
3. To negotiate partial arrangements, of which there exists an
endless range of possible territorial and functional arrangements
for sharing sovereignty or control over the whole or parts of the
territory of East Jerusalem. Examples of possible partial arrangements are discussed below.
C. The Payoffs
The expected payoffs for each party from the exercise of full sovereignty or control over all parts of East Jerusalem are considerable. As
explained above, the issue of Jerusalem has become a major national and
religious symbol for both the Israeli and the Palestinian peoples (and
much beyond them). The importance of the Jerusalem issue for both
peoples prescribes very high negative payoffs for the party that would
relinquish its claim to sovereignty or control over all parts of East Jerusalem. The price of the latter strategy seems so immense that it may well be
insurmountable for national leaders on both sides. This fact practically
rules out almost any possibility that the two main players will accept an
agreement embodying one of the two extreme strategies.
This directs us to the third strategy: reaching some partial arrangement. It is clear that the payoffs arising for the parties from some partial
arrangement will correspond to the content of the specific agreement.
Beyond this general observation, it is noteworthy to point out that some
elements of partial arrangements may carry asymmetric payoffs for the
players. An identification of all such elements is of importance and may
narrow the practical range of possible partial arrangements that the main
players are likely to accept. Such a comprehensive task, however, exceeds the limits of this study, and we will have to limit ourselves to the
34. See supra part IV, A.1.2. (discussing the possible roles of the players in the middle
and outer circles).
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identification of the most principal elements that produce asymmetric
payoffs.
For Israel, the negative payoffs expected from certain partial arrangemeits may be higher than those expected for the Palestinians. This is
particularly true with regard to the Western Wall and the new Jewish
neighborhoods in East Jerusalem. The government of Israel might suffer
considerable negative payoffs if it would relinquish control of or recognize Palestinian sovereignty over the Western Wall, as the site is most
sacred to Jews. The immense negative payoffs arising from such a concession practically rule out this possibility.
The issue of the new Jewish neighborhoods in East Jerusalem illustrates the technique of "preemption" or "irrevocable commitment,"
which is well-known in game theory. The employment of this technique
enables a player to change the payoffs produced from some move by
committing, at an early stage, certain resources, part of which must be
"sunk" (i.e. unrecoverable in a later stage).35 Such action increases the
negative payoffs arising for the investing party from a particular move
and, if the commitment is unambiguously visible to the other player, it
changes the other player's equilibrium strategies. 3 6 Since the Israeli
seizure of East Jerusalem in 1967, Israeli governments have committed
vast amounts of financial and personal resources to build new neighborhoods and settle more than 150,000 Jews in this part of the City.3 7 The
negative payoffs expected for Israel from withdrawing from these areas,
or from relocating a significant number of Israeli inhabitants, seem very
high. This fact considerably reduces the likelihood that Israel will adopt
such a move. In fact, it seems that the Palestinians are aware of these
facts, and some of their leaders already have indicated implicitly that they
would be ready to recognize Israeli sovereignty and control over these
new neighborhoods in the future.3"
35. See BAIRD ET AL., supra note 21, at 60-61.
36. See id. at 57-63; see also THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 22-

28 (reprint 1980) (1960).
37. The 152,000 Jews living in East Jerusalem constitute 48.9% of the overall population in this part of the City. THE STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF JERUSALEM.
38. See KLEIN, supra note 8, at 40. The legal actions Israel took at the municipal level
in July, 1967, also may be perceived, to some extent, as a preemption act. Shortly after the
Israeli seizure of East Jerusalem, the Israeli Parliament and government enacted a series of
legislative measures resulting in the application of Israeli law, jurisdiction, and administration to East Jerusalem. See THE JERUSALEM QUESTION AND ITS RESOLUTION: SELECTED
DOCUMENTS 167 (Ruth Lapidoth & Moshe Hirsch eds., 1994) (providing the text of this
legislation). The legal significance of these enactments has been examined in several decisions Israeli courts handed down, embodying the unequivocal conclusion that East Jerusalem had become part of the State of Israel. See id. at 489-90, 502-06, 535-39 (discussing
various cases that reached this conclusion). While these legislative and judicial actions are
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For the Palestinians, some elements of a partial arrangement may produce greater negative payoffs than for Israel. This fact is most prominent
with regard to the Al-Aqsa Mosque and the Dome of the Rock on the
Temple Mount (al-Haramash-Sharifin Arabic).3 9 Because both sites are
sacred to Islam, Palestinian recognition of Israeli sovereignty or control
over these shrines would generate considerable negative payoffs for the
Palestinians. Again, the expected negative payoffs from such a Palestinian move practically rules out this possibility.
Similarly, though to a lesser degree, the Palestinians might suffer significant negative payoffs if the new arrangement fails to establish or recognize some link between the Palestinians living in East Jerusalem, and the
Palestinian entity in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. As noted above,
the Palestinians previously asserted that East Jerusalem is an integral part
of the West Bank, and the same legal regime should apply to both territories.4 o The recent agreements between Israel and the Palestinians include
some link between the Palestinians of East Jerusalem and the Palestinian
Council. The election arrangements the parties agreed to entitled these
Palestinians to participate in the election process in the West Bank and
Gaza Strip.

VI.

THE STRUCTURAL FEATURES OF THE "GAME" OF JERUSALEM

While numerous analysts agree that the question of Jerusalem's future
is the most difficult issue on the agenda between Israel and the Palestinians, different reasons have been presented to explain this difficulty. In
this section we shall discuss some structural features that shape the problematic interaction in the "game" of Jerusalem. The identification of the
structural stumbling blocks and the comprehension of their content will
lead us to consider, in the next section, possible changes that may influence future negotiations between the parties.
A.

Zero-Sum Games

"Zero-sum game" (or constant-sum game) is unquestionably one of the
most famous concepts of game theory which served, especially in the
early stages of the theory's development, as a polar case and historical
point of departure. The key feature of a zero-sum game is that the sum of
payoffs is constant: "[i]n a two-player zero-sum game, whatever one
not irreversible, they certainly increase the negative payoffs Israel can expect if it relinquishes some of its sovereignty over East Jerusalem.
39. See infra note 50.
40. See supra part II.
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player wins the other loses.",4 1 The players in zero-sum games have opposed preferences and are considered rivals. Players in such situations
are in conflict and are not inclined to cooperate.4 2 Thus, as long as the
structure of a given situation is that of a zero-sum game, the likelihood of
a compromise is significantly reduced.
The basic structure of the dispute between Israel and the Palestinians
over Jerusalem has strong features of a zero-sum game. The parties perceive the conflict over East Jerusalem chiefly as a territorial dispute.
Each party is interested in gaining full and exclusive sovereignty or control over all parts of the eastern City. Needless to say, these preferences
are bitterly opposed, as any gain for one party directly entails a loss for
the other.4 3 As explained above, as long as the situation has the basic
features of a zero-sum game, the prospects for a compromise between
Israel and the Palestinians is significantly reduced.
B.

Exit Options

One of the central factors influencing the outcomes of a bargaining
process is the "exit option" available to each player in case of bargaining
failure. Exit options influence the readiness of the respective parties to
leave the negotiation table, and as Frederik Zeuthen observed in his celebrated article, Economic Warfare, the parties' readiness "to fight the matter out" determines the course of the negotiations.44 The principal
41. FUDENBERG & TIROLE, supra note 14, at 4; see JAMES D. MORROW, GAME THEORY FOR POLITICAL SCIENTISTS 74-75 (1994); see also LUCE & RAIFFA, supra note 14, at
56-59 (describing the concept of a two-person zero-sum game); VON NEUMANN & MORGENSTERN, supra note 14, at 46-47, 98-100 (discussing the formulation of a two-person
zero-sum game).
42. VON NUEMANN & MORGENSTERN, supra note 14, at 46-47, 98-100; see John C.
Harsanyi, Bargainingand Conflict Situations in Light of a New Approach to Game Theory,
in BARGAINING: FORMAL THEORIES OF NEGOTIATION 74, 83 (Oran R. Young ed., 1975).
43. The game of Jerusalem is not a pure zero-sum game. While each gain for one
player entails a loss for the other, the value of such payoffs is not always symmetrical. As
part V.C, supra, notes, the parties' acceptance of several arrangements might generate
greater negative payoffs for one party than the positive payoffs produced for the other.
See MORROW, supra note 41, at 75 (noting that "almost all interesting social phenomena
create mixed motives for the parties involved" and therefore are not good models of zerosum games).
44. See, e.g., BAIRD ET AL., supra note 21, at 226; Frederik Zeuthen, Economic Warfare, in BARGAINING: FORMAL THEORIES OF NEGOTIATIONS, supra note 42, at 145, 151,
162. For a discussion of the importance of exit options, see BAIRD ET AL., supra note 21, at
224-32; HOWARD RAIFFA, THE ART & SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION 14-15 (1982) (discussing

the power of walking away); Roger Fisher, Negotiating Power: Getting and Using Influence,

in

NEGOTIATION THEORY AND PRACTICE

127, 132-33 (J. William Breslin & Jeffrey Z.

Rubin eds., 1991) (stating that power in negotiations "depends upon how well I can do for
myself if I walk away"); David A. Lax & James K. Sebenius, The Power of Alternatives or
the Limits to Negotiations, in NEGOTIATION: THEORY AND PRACTICE, supra, at 97, 97-105
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question arising here is: What is the alternative for each party if an agreement is not concluded? In the "game" of Jerusalem, two kinds of exit
options may be relevant: (1) legal exit options and (2) factual exit
options.
1.

Legal Exit Options

Starting with the legal exit options, the legal system relevant to the
question of sovereignty or control over Jerusalem is international law.
International law, as municipal systems of law,4 5 provides default rules
applicable to the relationship between the parties, as long as the parties
do not reach an agreement embodying different rules.4 6 The content of
these default rules has a considerable bearing upon the outcome of the
bargaining process and, therefore, it is commonly said that negotiations
are conducted "in the shadow of law." Generally, the content of alternative legal rules narrows the range of possible arrangements the parties
agree to.
One of the principal factors explaining the difficulty in resolving the
dispute over Jerusalem lies in the fact that international law does not provide the parties with clear default rules, if any, to the question "Whose
Jerusalem?" States and scholars have presented numerous legal positions
on this question, but neither the international community nor any authoritative institution widely accepted them. 7 As in other legal spheres,
where law does not give clear answers to existing problems, its influence
upon the behavior of the actors diminishes. This is clearly the case with
the extent of international law's influence upon the course of the "game"
of Jerusalem. Thus, the absence of legal exit options enhances the role of
factual alternatives available to the parties.
("[Tihe parties' best alternative without agreement imply the limits to any agreement.");
see also Janice G. Stein, The PoliticalEconomy of Security Agreements: The Linked Costs
of Failureat Camp David, in DOUBLE-EDGED DIPLOMACY: INTERNATIONAL BARGAINING
AND DOMESTIC POLrICs 77, 87-90 (Peter B. Evans et al. eds., 1993) (examining the importance of the participating parties' exit options during the 1978 Camp David negotiations).
45. See, e.g., BAIRD ET AL., supra note 21, at 224 (analyzing how legal rules affect the
types of bargains parties strike).
46. Important (though not frequent) exceptions to this observation are mandatory
rules of any legal system that the parties to an agreement cannot modify. In international
law, for example, "[a] treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a
peremptory norm of general international law." Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 22, 1969, art. 53, reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679, 698-99.
47. For a survey of the various legal positions on the status of Jerusalem under international law, see Michael Eisner, Jerusalem: An Analysis of Legal Claims and PoliticalRealities, 12 Wis. INT'L L. J. 221, 238-60 (1994); see also HIRSCH ET AL., supra note 3, at 15-21;
Larry Kletter, Note, The Sovereignty of Jerusalem in International Law, 20 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 319, 330-56 (1981).
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Factual Exit Options

The factual alternatives to bargaining failure between Israel and the
Palestinians over the issue of East Jerusalem are asymmetric. In the absence of an agreement between the parties, the current situation is likely
to proceed into the future, and this exit option is in Israel's favor. Israel
currently maintains control over East Jerusalem,48 and this situation is
expected to continue unless Israel unilaterally decides to relinquish such
control or an outside power forces it to do so; both developments, however, seem very remote. Israeli insistence on preserving the present status
quo, however, would not satisfy minimal Palestinian demands and expectations (following the DOP's provisions), and such a situation may lead to
a deadlock in the permanent status negotiations. Cessation of or considerable delay in the negotiations may result in violent clashes between
Palestinians and Israelis. Such a possible development, however, even if
it were to materialize, is not likely to lead Israeli leaders to relinquish
control over East Jerusalem or to be more flexible regarding future compromise; but it may well generate negative payoffs for both sides.
Thus, the exit option to bargaining failure in the "game" of Jerusalem is
a certain continuation of Israeli control over all of Jerusalem, with the
possibility of an impasse in the negotiations and some violent activities by
the Palestinians. While this alternative might produce negative payoffs
for both sides, it is clearly more favorable to Israel than to the Palestinians. The existence of such a favorable exit option for Israel indicates that
Israel's readiness to face a bargaining failure in the "game" of Jerusalem
is significantly greater than the Palestinians' readiness to face a bargaining failure. Moreover, this feature explains Israel's past policy of refusing
to enter into negotiations over the future of Jerusalem.
C. Embedded Games
The above analysis of the structure of the "game" of Jerusalem may
explain why the main parties have not reached a final compromise thus
far, but the initial compromise achieved in the 1993 DOP can hardly be
explained. Furthermore, as to future prospects for any agreed upon settlement, given the above factors, Israel does not seem to have a considerable incentive to relinquish even part of its control over East Jerusalem
and to bear the ensuing negative payoffs. Indeed, if the "game" of Jerusalem had been an isolated one, the pre-1993 deadlock likely would have
proceeded into the future. The concept of "embedded games" may ex48. It should be noted that since 1967 Israel has allowed the Muslim Waqf to administer the AI-Aqsa Mosque and the Dome of the Rock.
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plain the dramatic change in the 1993 DOP, and possible ones in the
future.
Frequently, the failure to analyze a social phenomenon properly by
game theoretic models stems from misidentification of a particular situation as "the" game while, in reality, it is embedded in a larger game.4 9
The characterization of a given game as a "subgame" within a larger one,
and the identification of the larger game itself, has important implications
for its analysis.5" Particularly, as in other cases, focusing on only the interactions between Israel and the Palestinians in the "game" of Jerusalem
may hinder our ability to properly understand the whole "game" and its
likely course of play.
The "game" of Jerusalem is of great importance to both Israel and the
Palestinians, but it certainly is not the only one, and not even the most
crucial one, between them. Rather, the "game" of Jerusalem is embedded in a larger framework, in which the "master-game" is the regime to
be established in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and the degree of
independence Israel will accord to the Palestinian self-governing authorities. The linkage between these two issues was formed in the negotiations
between the two parties that concluded the 1993 DOP. The Palestinians
were not ready to sign the agreement stipulating the principles for Palestinian self-government in the West Bank and Gaza Strip unless Israel included some compromise regarding Jerusalem in the agreement. The
parties reached only an initial compromise,5 1 but without this linkage between the two sub-games, the likelihood of such an agreement would
have been slight.
D. Domestic Win-Sets
The significant factors influencing the outcomes of the negotiations
over Jerusalem are located not only on an international level, but on a
domestic level as well. As Robert Putnam analyzed, the dynamics of
many international negotiations can be conceived usefully as a two-level
game.5 2 At "the national level, domestic groups pursue their interests by
49. See BAIRD ET AL., supra note 21, at 191-95 (describing and providing examples of
embedded games). Id. at 194.
50. See id. at 192-94. For a technical definition of "subgame," see GIBBONS, supra
note 14, at 122-25.

51. See supra part II.
52. Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level
Games, 42 Ir'L ORG. 427, 434 (1988), reprinted in DOUBLE-EDGED DIPLOMACY: INTERNATIONAL BARGAINING AND DOMESTIC POLITICS, supra note 44, app. An expanded collaborative project followed Putnam's two-level game analysis. DOUBLE-EDGED
DIPLOMACY: INTERNATIONAL BARGAINING AND DOMESTIC POLITICS, supra note 44. For
some refinement and criticism of the two-level game approach (i.e. incorporation of alli-
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pressuring the government to adopt favorable policies and politicians
seek power by constructing coalitions among those groups.53 At the international level, governments seek to maximize their own ability to satisfy domestic pressures, while minimizing the adverse consequences of
foreign developments." 5 4 Each national leader appears at both game
boards." The underlying fact is that the domestic constituents must endorse 56 any agreement concluded on the international level.57
Putnam defined a "win-set" for a given domestic constituency as the set
of all possible international agreements that would "win" the endorsement among the domestic constituents. 58 Thus, by definition, any successful international agreement must fall within the domestic win-set of
each of the parties to the agreement; or, in other words, the agreement is
possible only if those win-sets overlap. The clear result is that the larger
the win-set of each player, the more likely they are to overlap; or, the
opposite, the smaller the win-sets, the greater risk that the negotiations
will break down.59 One factor influencing the win-sets of the parties is
the extent of homogeneity of the domestic constituents regarding the issue at the negotiation table. It is not rare that some segment of one
party's domestic population supports the contention of the other party
(e.g., regarding trade liberalization). Generally, the more diffuse the positions are within the domestic constituents of the parties, the easier it
6°
might be to achieve an agreement on the international level.
The relative size of the respective domestic win-sets affects not only the
likelihood of successful negotiations, but also the distribution of the
payoffs between the players. Generally, the larger the win-set of a party,
the more amenable he is to granting concessions in the other party's
favor; or, conversely, the player with the narrower win-set is in a better
position to compel the other player to make greater concessions. Thus,
ance partners as a third level in the game), see Jeffrey W. Knopf, Beyond Two-Level
Games: Domestic-InternationalInteraction in the Intermediate-RangeNuclear Forces Negotiations, 47 INT'L ORG. 599 (1993).
53. Putnam, supra note 52, at 436.
54. Id. at 436-37 (footnote added).
55. See id. 436-43.

56. Putnam labels the process of endorsement by domestic constituents as "ratification." This ratification may take several forms such as voting procedure or any other decision-process at the domestic level that is required to endorse or to implement the
agreement, whether formally or informally. Putnam, supra note 52, at 438.
57. This is particularly true for democracies, but applies to non-democratic regimes as
well because the actors at the domestic level may represent bureaucratic agencies, interest
groups, social classes, or even public opinion. Putnam, supra note 52, at 438-39.
58. Id. at 439-40.
59. Id.

60. Id. at 443-45;

RAIFFA,

supra note 44, at 12.
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quite paradoxically, a narrower win-set might be considered an advantage
during international negotiations. 6 '
The size of the respective win-sets of Israel and the Palestinians provides one significant reason why it has been so difficult to achieve an
agreement in the game of Jerusalem. As stated above, the question of
Jerusalem has become a major national and religious symbol for peoples
on both sides, thus significantly reducing the win-sets of both players and
the likelihood of an overlap. An examination of the level of homogeneity
within the domestic constituents of the parties reinforces the conclusion.
The domestic constituents of both parties are quite unified in that regard,
i.e., the majority of the domestic populations of both Israel and the Palestinians is very much interested in having its government exercise sovereignty and control over East Jerusalem. As explained above, this factor
increases the likelihood of a bargaining failure.
VII.

POSSIBLE STRUCTURAL CHANGES AND THE FUTURE
NEGOTIATIONS OVER JERUSALEM

The above analysis of the basic structure of the "game" of Jerusalem
raises two principal questions: the first question is whether the structural
factors are static or amenable to changes; the second question is what are
the effects of some possible changes upon the outcomes of future negotiations. As shown below, the main parties or the players in the middle and
external circles certainly may modify some structural features. In this
section, we shall analyze possible changes and their likely implications.
One factor that has a major influence upon the outcome of future negotiations, whether some compromise is reached or a bargaining failure
occurs, is the structure of the "game" of Jerusalem as a zero-sum game.
As explained previously, the key feature of a zero-sum game is that
whatever one player wins the other loses. 62 Players in such situations are
considered to be in conflict and are not inclined to cooperate or compromise. 63 So far, the "game" of Jerusalem has had strong features of a zerosum game and, as long as this situation prevails, the likelihood for a compromise is significantly reduced. Three principal techniques may transform the structure of the game into a non-zero sum game: (a) increasing
the payoffs for some moves; (b) expanding the scope of the game; or (c)
combining several sub-games into one game.
The first technique to change the structure of a zero-sum game is to
provide the players (either one or both) with some additional payoffs if
61. Putnam, supra note 52, at 440.
62. Supra part VI.A.
63. Supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
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an agreement is reached, but without a correlative loss to the other party.
The players in the external and middle circles (e.g., the United States or
the European Union) primarily may supply the new payoffs. The players
in these circles may provide the main players with various kinds of assistance, the most notable (but not the most important) being economic
assistance. Thus, for instance, the United States or the European Union
may channel significant financial resources into East Jerusalem to raise
the standard of living of the Palestinians residing in that area, or to establish new medical or academic institutions in the Jewish neighborhoods.
Economic assistance also may take the form of trade preferences,
whereby the United States or the European Union may grant privileged
trade concessions to products manufactured in East Jerusalem (either by
Jews or Palestinians) and imported into their territories.
Economic payoffs are not the only payoffs in game theory' and the
"game" of Jerusalem well illustrates a game in which social, religious, and
symbolic gains outweigh economic ones. Non-economic payoffs that
players outside the inner circle provide may consist of international recognition. States in the middle and the external circle, such as the United
States and European Union, may decide to recognize Jerusalem as the
capital of the State of Israel, and transfer their embassies to the City. To
Israel, such a move might be considered a significant payoff.65 As for the
Palestinians, the United States and European Union may choose to recognize the Palestinian Authority as having some international status, or
assist it to become a sui generis or regular member of some intergovernmental organizations.
The second possible technique to change the structure of the game is to
have the main players themselves expand its scope. An expansion of the
game into new domains that do not have a zero-sum character may transform the structure of the game into a non-zero one. The game of Jerusalem may be enlarged to include either new territories or symbols, or both.
On the geographical level, the city boundaries may be expanded to include areas that currently are not within Jerusalem. 66 The enlarged Jeru64. See MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOOD
AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 60-65 (1965) (discussing the role of non-economic incen-

tives such as prestige, respect, friendship, and social advances in decision-making).
65. Although Israel has declared Jerusalem to be its capital, most states have declined
to recognize, at least de jure, this fact. The states' reactions have resulted in a variety of
measures, the most prominent being the location of all embassies (except two) outside
Jerusalem. See S.C. Res. 478, U.N. SCOR, 35th Sess., 2245th mtg., at 14 (1980) (calling
upon the United Nations members to withdraw their diplomatic missions from Jerusalem).
66. The United Nations General Assembly proposed the enlargement of the City in
Resolution 181 (II) on the "Future Government of Palestine." See G.A. Res. 181 (II),
U.N. Doc. A/64, at 131, 146-50 (1946). Several subsequent proposals for the future of
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salem may include adjoining territories in the West Bank. Though there
is some controversy over the final status of the West Bank, the dispute
over its status does not have the strong zero-sum features of the "game"
of Jerusalem.67
On the symbolic level, the "game" of Jerusalem may be expanded to
include new symbols. As noted above, the main struggle in Jerusalem is
for symbols; and the main parties may create some new symbols, mainly
religious and cultural in nature themselves. Thus, for instance, new symbols may take the form of new title roles such as the Guardian of the
Muslim Holy Places in Jerusalem, the Chairman of the Consultative
Committee on the Muslim Holy Places in Jerusalem, or of raising a religious Muslim (not national) flag over some Muslim Holy shrines. Symbolic functions in the Muslim Holy Places may well play a significant role
in the "game" of Jerusalem, and their allocation should not be necessarily
limited to the main players. In fact, granting such roles to some Arab
states may encourage them to provide significant payoffs (either financial
or non-financial) to the main players.
Last, but not least, the possibility of establishing new religious buildings or monuments in Jerusalem should not be lightly discarded. The importance of such new sites certainly will be on a much lower scale than
the Western Wall or the Al-Aqsa Mosque, but this does not mean that
they will be of no significant symbolic importance at all for the parties.
The establishment of new religious buildings or monuments may assist
the main parties to allocate symbols, both among themselves and with
players in the other circles. If this method is employed, the new religious
sites should not be, of course, only Muslim or Jewish ones, but new Christian sites also may be established in East Jerusalem.
The third possible method to change the structure of the "game" of
Jerusalem is to embed it in some other sub-game. Here, it may be desirable to embed the sub-game of Jerusalem with other sub-games that do
not have inherent zero-sum features. The difference between the heretofore described method of expanding the game and that of embedding it
within some other sub-game, lies in the nexus between the relevant game
Jerusalem included expansion of the City's boundaries. See Proposal by Dr. Meron
Benvenisti, MA'ARIV, May 4, 1971, reprinted in HIRSCH ET AL., supra note 3, at 52-56
(translated from Hebrew into English); see also C. Albin et al., Harry S. Truman Research
Institute for the Advancement of Peace, and the Arab Studies Society, Jerusalem, Jerusalem: An Undivided City as Dual Capital, Working Paper Series No. 16, (1991-92); R. Benkler, Proposals for Determining the Status of Jerusalem, 8 INT'L PROBLEMS 8 (1970)
(Hebrew).
67. While under Israeli law, East Jerusalem is considered a part of the State of Israel,
see supra part V., this is not the case with the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
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and the new element. While the technique of expansion assimilates the
new element into the existing game, the method of embedding creates a
link between the two sub-games, yet preserves their independence.
The frontrunner sub-game to be embedded within the "game" of Jerusalem is the permanent status of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The
linkage between these two issues already was formed in the negotiations
leading to the 1993 DOP, 68 and this pattern may recur in the next round
of negotiations. In light of past experience, however, it should be emphasized that employment of the method of embedding does not inevitably
suggest that Israel will be the player who makes the concessions in the
Jerusalem sub-game, in favor of some gain in the sub-game of the West
Bank and Gaza Strip. In fact, it is certainly possible that the direction
will be the opposite. For instance, it is possible that Israel would be ready
to relinquish its opposition to the establishment of a Palestinian state in
exchange for Palestinian recognition that East Jerusalem (or almost all of
it) is under Israeli lawful sovereignty. Of course, this is only one example
of numerous possible trade-offs between the two sub-games. Beyond the
possibility of embedding the Jerusalem sub-game within that of the permanent status of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, the parties also may
consider other sub-games, such as those involving security arrangements
and economic relations.
The win-sets of the respective parties also may undergo some changes
and modify the likelihood that the parties will reach an agreement. As
explained above, the greater the domestic win-sets of the players, the
more likely they are to overlap and lead to an agreement. 69 The win-sets
of the parties may be enlarged or narrowed in accordance with changes in
the payoffs produced to the parties, or in line with a combination of the
"game" of Jerusalem with other sub-games. These possible changes are
enumerated above,7" and need not be repeated here. If changes to the
"game" of Jerusalem modify the preferences of only some segments of
the domestic population (as expected in our case), it will lessen the current level of homogeneity within the domestic constituents and increase
the likelihood of an agreement. As noted above, the more diffuse the
domestic positions are, the easier it might be to achieve an agreement on
the international level.71
The larger the win-set of a party on the domestic level, the more amenable the party is to concessions on the international level.7 2 This fact
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

See supra part VI.C.
Supra part VI.D.
See discussion supra, part VII.
See supra part VI.D. (discussing domestic win sets).
See supra VI.D. (same).
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may lead the parties to seek to enlarge the win-set of the other side during
the negotiations (e.g., by communicating directly with the other sides' domestic constituents), and likewise, because the player with the narrower
win-set is in a better position to compel the other player to greater concessions, the negotiators may attempt to portray their respective sides as
73
having very narrow win-sets.
VIII.

CONCLUSIONS

The structural features of the "game" of Jerusalem, especially its character as a zero-sum game with small domestic win-sets, explain why it is
so difficult to negotiate a solution to the question of Jerusalem. An examination of the exit options available to the parties reveals the asymmetric bargaining positions of the parties, with a clear preference for
Israel. Moreover, the existence of viable exit options explains Israel's past
policy regarding negotiations over Jerusalem. These structural features
alone indicate the low probability that a compromise between Israel and
the Palestinians will be achieved in the future.
The probability of a successful compromise will increase, however, if
the structure of the "game" of Jerusalem is changed either by increasing
the payoffs generated to the parties in the event of agreement, or by expanding the game's functional scope (through the technique of embedment or enlargement). Such moves, if the contending parties adopt them,
may enhance their ability to exchange payoffs in a broader domain, and
make it easier for them to reach some compromise. If an agreement is
not achieved in the next round of negotiations, Israel will continue to
exercise control over all parts of East Jerusalem, with the Palestinians
possibly terminating the negotiations in all tracks or even initiating violent activities. Israel's current preferred exit option seems so solid that it
would be very difficult, even with the employment of the above methods,
to balance completely the competing bargaining positions of the parties.
This factor leads to the conclusion that certain structural changes may
increase significantly the probability of a compromise between the parties, but Israel's preferred position likely will continue to overshadow the
future course of the "game" of Jerusalem.
In light of the preceding analysis, we may examine the contributions of
game theory to the research on the question of Jerusalem and its resolution. Game theory is focused on one set of factors, i.e. strategical factors,
in the interaction between the players in the "game" of Jerusalem. Game
73. For a discussion of the possible ways to enlarge an opposing party's win-set, and to
exaggerate the tightness of the negotiator's domestic win-set, see Putnam, supra note 52, at
454-55; see also Knopf, supra note 52, at 602.
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theoretic analysis does not take into account external factors, such as personal characteristics of the decision makers or social values prevailing in
their communities. The significance of the latter factors in numerous interactive situations indicates that game theory should not be the only instrument used to analyze social phenomena like the controversy over the
future of Jerusalem. The limitation to only interactive factors, however,
enables us to concentrate on one set of variables, and to explore in depth
their effects on the behavior of the players and the interplay between
these variables.
An analysis of the controversy over Jerusalem using concepts of game
theory enables us to identify some important structural features standing
at the base of the conflict, and to understand the course of the "game" up
to the present time. Furthermore, the comprehension of these factors
provides a valuable instrument to modify the course of the "game" by
changing its structural features. It should be noted, however, that while
theoretically it is always possible to change the structure of an interactive
situation, such changes are not possible in all cases. This is true, for example, with regard to a change in the exit options in the "game" of Jerusalem, since it is doubtful whether customary international law or future
agreements between the parties will modify the legal exit options in the
coming years. Similarly, the factual exit options in the "game" of Jerusalem theoretically might be changed by the main players or by those in the
middle and the external circles, but the likelihood of a significant development in that respect is quite remote.
This brief article is not intended to cover all issues relating to game
theory and the future negotiations over Jerusalem. The article rather focuses on certain elements of the "game" of Jerusalem, and how structural
changes are likely to affect the parties' ability to reach an agreement.
Game theory concepts deal not only with the outcome of reaching an
agreement or bargaining failure, but also with the allocation of payoffs
between the players. This subject was touched upon only slightly in some
parts of this article, and deserves a separate study. Furthermore, this article focuses mainly on structural factors, while further studies may explore
the influence of other variables (e.g., risk aversion, information, urgency)
on the future course of the "game" of Jerusalem. Such possible studies
may add an additional and interesting dimension to the current literature
on the future of Jerusalem, and perhaps even assist those actively seeking
a solution to the question of Jerusalem.

